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I was six. Our kindergarten teacher had given us an assignment. We were to fill
in the dotted lines of several drawings in the right color. The dotted lines
resembling the water jet coming out of the garden hose were to be blue, only I
drew them yellow. I remember thinking about what color to choose. To me,
water had no color. It was transparent. No color or all colors, but not just a color.
But how do you draw something transparent? I chose yellow. Of the colors
available, yellow was the lightest and most transparent color that I could think
of. I was not completely satisfied, but it was the best solution I could come up
with. The teacher looked through my work and marked the drawing with the
water jet with a red X – red X for wrong, for failure. I was told that water was
not yellow, it was blue. I can still recall my frustration and mixed emotions
triggered by her response. I experienced a feeling of shame and inferiority for
having gotten it wrong. Everyone else in the class got it right. But I also felt a
sense of protest, of rebellion and resistance. I wondered why my teacher’s
solution was the right one. What is the color of water?
***
Prologue
A story is commonly defined as having a certain structure; it has a beginning, middle
and concluding section. In a story, one thing happens as a consequence of another
(Polkinghorne, 1995; Richardson, 1997). According to Frank (2010), a story is told because
something a bit out of the ordinary happened. I recently obtained my PhD degree, and I can
call myself a researcher. My qualitative research has yielded certain findings and, based on
these, implications for further research and clinical practice. But parallel to this development
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of knowledge, there is also another story that has been unfolding. I like to refer to this as the
story of my becoming a researcher. If it is a story, does it have a clear structure? And what are
the crucial elements and experiences that shape this story? How is the story of my becoming a
researcher related to the story of the knowledge developed from my Ph.D. project? To me, the
story of my becoming a researcher has been an arduous journey that started long before my
Ph.D. project began. I do not actually know when it began. I certainly hope it has not ended.
In this paper I aim to unfold and critically reflect on my becoming a researcher. In doing
so, I will explore how the development of knowledge and my understanding of what counts as
knowledge is entangled with my personal and professional development. Through this personal
exploration, a further aim is also to explore and interrogate what counts as qualitative
knowledge and inquiry in contemporary academia. In line with the questions posed above, the
story of my becoming a researcher is perhaps best characterized as a messy one with no clear
point of departure or end station. The paper is written up in a manner that aims to reflect some
of this wandering about in the sometimes seemingly foggy landscape. Some of the critical
experiences that guided this process and influenced my directions are included in the paper,
expressed as three different acts. These three acts are also illustrated with personal vignettes.
The acts are followed by an epilogue that reflects and challenges what counts as knowledge
and research in contemporary academia.
According to Flyvbjerg (2001, p. 223), “Social science has not succeeded in producing
general, context-independent theory and, thus, has in the final instance nothing else to offer
than concrete, context-dependent knowledge.” A growing awareness of the impact of context
and of how truth(s) and knowledge in social sciences can be understood as unstable and
changing constitute crucial elements in the story of my becoming as a researcher. Perhaps even
more so, my story is about how these truths and this knowledge is irrevocably entwined with
me as an unfinalized and changing person. It has moved from being a story about a researcher
researching a separate world to one of how researcher and participants, matter and meaning are
entangled.
I used to think that becoming a researcher was about acquiring certain knowledge and
skills in order to fulfill the role of researcher. I imagined that in fulfilling this role, my
researcher self would come to the fore. All the other parts of me would of course still be there
but would constitute a backcloth that would not really be of interest or importance. Richardson
(1997) describes this as the “story line” that academics are given. This story line implies that
the “I” should be suppressed in academic work and writing, on behalf of the all-knowing and
all-powerful work of the academy. Richardson argued this twenty years ago. In spite of this
and more recent related critiques of conventional qualitative inquiry (Grant, 2018; Jackson &
Mazzei, 2009, 2012), in my experience the critically reflexive, emerging and diffractive “I”
still seems to be offered limited space and attention in mainstream qualitative research. This
does not mean that this is always the case. In certain academic communities there appears to
be a growing interest in and acceptance of critical qualitative inquiry. For many academics and
students, however, it seems to be the case that the story line of conventional approaches is
frequently taught and offered (Grant, 2016, 2018).
For me, the “I” is not of tremendous interest just because it is “the I,” but because it has
become increasingly clear to me at a personal level that it is irrevocably and constantly
intertwined with knowledge and truths and, thus, to the story of my becoming a researcher. I
sometimes wished this was not so for me as I am generally not a person who craves attention.
However, despite an occasional desire to stay in the shadows and fiddle with my research and
writings, I have come to a growing conviction that my “I” cannot be left out.
This “I” is uncomfortable with the fact that in academia and in life we often appear to
be given the storyline that there are right answers and truths. On the one hand, a world with no
answers may be accused of being relativistic and confusing. Confirming approaches and
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categorization in accordance with the already known can be important in research. On the other
hand, much can be lost when only sticking to predefined research storylines (Davies, 2016). In
order to develop knowledge and avoid reproducing the already known, the need to expand our
understanding of the meaning of research also seems to be apparent. On the basis of the
discussion so far, challenging and expanding our understanding of research involves
challenging and understanding what constitutes knowledge and what place different kinds of
knowledge have in the world. It also implicates awareness of ways of being, or, rather,
becoming in the world (Denzin & Giardinia, 2008; Law, 2004).
My own experience in the training of PhD students in the Norwegian context is that
such issues are often given limited attention. Methodological attempts to question, trouble and
expand the meaning of knowledge and ways of developing knowledge can even be discouraged
(Richardson, 1997). For instance, I was advised to use “proper,” meaning conventional,
qualitative approaches (Klevan, 2017). When sharing these experiences with other PhD
students or qualitative researchers nationally and internationally, such experiences appeared to
be the rule rather than the exception. PhD students often appear to be trained to do research,
but not so much to reflect critically on how research is done and what purposes it may serve.
Research in general is often described as having functions like testing hypotheses or
filling knowledge gaps. According to Grant (2014, 2016), who writes from a standpoint
position as a critical qualitative researcher, an equally important aim in qualitative research is
to trouble the world. Troubling—which in this context means challenging the tacit assumptions
governing specific aspects of life—clearly needs a troubler. As such, in doing research, being—
or, perhaps more so, becoming—a qualitative researcher can also be argued to be about
troubling oneself and one’s ways of reasoning.
My initial assumptions about reality, what can be known, and how to proceed in order
to explore the truth were subject to constant troubling and successive reorientations in the
course of my PhD project. These assumptions developed from searching for rule-based modes
of analyzing a truth that I more or less understood as being out there to understanding truth as
context-dependent, interpreted and co-created. An evolving understanding of how the
researcher, research participants and what counts as knowledge are situated in historical, social,
cultural and material contexts characterizes this process. Even more so, it involves taking in
and exploring how the ways through which we proceed to find or create knowledge are
inevitably entwined both with what we “find” and the “finder.” Barad (2007, p. 185) puts it
this way: “Practices of knowing and being are not isolable; they are mutually implicated. We
don’t obtain knowledge by standing outside the world; we know because we are of the world.”
What we regard as truth and how to get knowledge about truth is at the core of
ontological and epistemological questions. Understanding reality as “made,” becoming and
multiple is connected to understanding the acquiring of knowledge as becoming and multiple.
This necessitates research approaches and a researcher evolving together in terms of
questioning and troubling how knowledge is generated, the knowledge itself and how both
these issues are contextually situated. Thus, knowing is never developed in isolation (Mazzei,
2014). An understanding of “reality” as becoming is entangled with selves becoming in the
world. In this sense, ontological and epistemological issues are related, and they contribute to
the becoming of each other. As such, to me the term onto-epistemology turned out to provide
a useful way of thinking, indicating that we are in fact dealing with the study of practices of
knowing in being, or more so, becoming in the world (Barad, 2007; Davies, 2016; Kaiser &
Thiele, 2014).
Setting out on onto-epistemological journeys, derived from understandings of world
as is and the researcher as a coherent and stable self to world and researcher becoming and
entangled require research communities that allow for and encourage breaches with the
common storyline offered to academics (Richardson, 1997). Encounters and dialogue with
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troubling others that challenged and encouraged me to expand and rethink my framework
turned out to be golden. The encounters with troubling-nurturers have been crucial to my
becoming as a researcher. The voices of my two most important ones are included at the end
of this paper as positioned responses to what I have written.
The PhD Project
The aim of my PhD project was to explore experiences of helpful help in a mental health
crisis within the context of crisis resolution teams. Helpful help was explored from three
different perspectives: service users, family careers, and clinicians. The overall study consisted
of three sub-studies—one for each group of participants. Altogether, I conducted 34 semistructured interviews that were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim (Klevan, 2017).
The design of the study, its findings and implications will not be explicitly elaborated
on in this paper. Rather, what follows is an attempt to describe and explore my process of,
simultaneously, developing knowledge and myself.
This PhD project was initially placed within a hermeneutic phenomenological
framework. My plan was to explore first-person, lived experiences, recognizing that conveying
and grasping these experiences would also involve interpretations from me as a researcher and
the participants. As the project developed, it became increasingly apparent to me that the idea
of developing knowledge based on decontextualized and common themes of experiences with
helpful help could definitely be questioned. Although an interpretive approach acknowledges
that experiences are interpreted through interaction with oneself and the other, there is still
commonly an expectation that interpretations are related to some kind of truth “out there.”
When trying to make sense of my evolving troubling relationship to truth, knowledge
and my role as a researcher, Ricouer’s distinction between hermeneutics of faith and
hermeneutics of suspicion provided a useful framework to me (Josselson, 2004; Sullivan,
2012). A hermeneutics of faith aims to examine a text in a manner that “gives voice” to the
participants, regarding the text as a window to the intended meaning of the participant.
Hermeneutics of suspicion, on the contrary, aim to decode and trouble the participant’s voice,
striving for interpretations that go beyond the text (Josselson, 2004; Sullivan, 2012). Different
methodologies will assume different levels of faith or suspicion in the interpretation of data.
In what follows, I will describe and explore my own evolving suspicion through three
different acts. Rather than being linear, the process from acts one through three can perhaps
more appropriately be described as a spiral. There is always something of the past in the present
and something of the present in how we understand the past, implying that entanglement of
becoming subjects and truths involve an entanglement of multiple presents and pasts.
Act 1 – The Hermeneutic Phenomenological Turn
In sub-study 1, which explored the experiences of service users, I used a hermeneutic
phenomenological approach combining elements from phenomenology and hermeneutics to
analyze data (Ajjawi & Higgs, 2007; Klevan, 2017; Klevan, Karlsson & Ruud, 2017; Laverty,
2003). I aimed to stay close to the lived experiences as expressed by the participants and to
represent, explore, and understand them. I entered the analysis with a faith that the voice of the
participants could serve as a kind of pipeline to their true lived experiences (Alvesson, 2003).
Although I used a semi-structured interview guide, participants also had the chance to elaborate
on what they found important. The participants appeared to grasp this opportunity, and thus
each interview appeared to have its own distinctive character.
To me, conducting and then listening to the audio-recorded interviews was an evocative
experience. I realized that in addition to gathering research data, I was hearing people’s stories.
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In this context, in line with Frank (2010), I understand stories as accounts that have personal
plots as an organizing device which have deep significance for the storyteller. Personal plot
appeared to run through each interview, forming a thread joining all interviews together. They
revealed that participants had reasons for participating which exceed simply providing research
data in response to interview questions.
The experience was somehow overwhelming. As an experienced clinician and grown
up person, how could I not have anticipated this? People do tell stories. The American poet
Muriel Rukeyser (1968, p. 115) states, “The universe is made of stories, not of atoms.” With a
whole universe made of stories, why should people not be telling stories just because the
context is research? The acknowledgement that people do tell stories even if you do not ask for
them to and that these stories are important because they say something about how people make
meaning off their experiences sparked off another question. How could I do justice to people’s
stories? In the analysis of the text, I worked based on my initial beliefs about the data
representing a possibility to reach the true meaning of the participants and the possibility of
finding some common themes that could capture the lived experiences of “helpful help.” There
was perhaps nothing wrong with the themes I ended up with. However, working with the
analysis and writing up the findings was accompanied by an increasing feeling of discomfort.
What I had experienced and received as a researcher seemed so rich, vivid and important. The
themes that were distilled from this richness through the analysis seemed scant, in comparison.
Not only did it seem like I was losing the context and nuances giving meaning to the
experiences of the participants, I also seemed to be losing the impetus to why it was important
for the participants to share them.
The days are short on the North Western coast of Norway in early December.
In combination with the decreasing daylight, the heavy snowfall makes driving
a challenge. I haven’t met a single car for the last hour, since I drove off the
ferry. The house appears on the left side of the road, covered in snow. Getting
out of the car, I am struck by the sound of silence of the falling snow. Soft and
yet so distinct. Is it a warm sound or is it a cold sound? She lives alone in the
house, after a divorce. The divorce did not only entail a breech with her husband
and children, it also caused the house to be more or less stripped for furniture
and household goods. In that house she shares her stories with me. The interview
lasts for more than two hours. In the middle of the interview, she asks that we
take a break so that she can cook lunch for me. The food is exquisite. She tells
me how placing emphasis on making delicious and healthy food is one way of
preserving dignity. There are many stories to be told.
Back in my tiny hotel room that night, I feel a desperate urge to call my family,
to reconnect with my world and stories. That soothing feeling when I hear my
daughter’s voice chattering on about school and that she is thinking about
bleaching her hair. About how the dog misses me. When are you coming home
mum? The house looks rather messy…
Who are we, when deprived of context? What are our experiences without the
stories they are enmeshed in? Loneliness is never just loneliness.
Troubling the Hermeneutic Phenomenological Turn
As I described above, in conducting interviews and in the process of transcribing, it
occurred to me that participants appeared to be telling personal stories that ran through the
semi-structured interviews. These stories framed the interviews in idiographic and personal
ways and this context provided was crucial in creating meaning of what was spoken of. By
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searching for common themes across the dataset, the importance of context was lost.
Furthermore, it appeared to me that by not involving the personal stories possible agendas
expressed by participants were somehow ignored. Though, as a researcher, I had an agenda for
conducting the interviews, it seemed apparent that so did the participants. The setting of the
interviews in people’s homes and the way participants so generously shared their personal
stories somehow required a different approach. It seemed crucial to aim to bring their stories
to the fore.
I needed to find a way of analyzing data that would safeguard the contextual stories
shared (Jones & Fenge, 2017). It was time to “move closer” and explore my notion that
participants were telling stories.
Act 2 – The Narrative Turn
My decision to use a different approach that preserved participant stories forced its way
through. At that point, in my mind, there was no other option. I aimed to develop an analytical
approach that could preserve the unique stories that the participants' experiences were
embedded in. I did not follow a rigorous set of procedures for narrative analysis. In fact, I did
not find such a “recipe.” Most of the approaches I found that were entitled “narrative analysis”
appeared to be the opposite of what I believed they would be, resembling what Polkinghorne
(1995) refers to as following paradigmatic cognition. A primary operation of paradigmatic
cognition is to classify objects or experiences as belonging to specific categories or concepts.
Polkinghorne (1995, p.1 2) calls this approach “analysis of narratives” and distinguishes it from
“narrative analysis.” In contrast to paradigmatic knowledge, which focuses on what is common
among actions, narrative knowledge and narrative analysis focuses on unique actions in context
(Polkinghorne, 1995).
I made a decision to conduct a narrative analysis of the interviews of my second substudy, using Polkinghorne’s (1995) definition and description as a guide. My first step involved
taking notes about immediate reflections after conducting the interviews. What was the
interview possibly about? The interviews were then transcribed verbatim before I read
transcripts naïvely, taking notes of reflections concerning possible plots in each interview. I
understood the plot as an organizing structure or common thread that served to give each
interview as a whole coherence and that the expressed store evolved around. I then reread each
transcript closely, marking possible plots and subplots. The evolving main plot of each
interview was iteratively tested in relation to the text in an attempt to determine if the plot I
had found could serve to configure the data into a coherent story. Following this, I constructed
a core story using mostly the informant’s own words around the emerging thematic plot for
each interview (Emden, 1998; McCormack, 2004).
To me, a narrative analysis seemed to encompass some of my evolving suspicion
related to the idea of being able to find a common truth out there. A narrative analysis can be
understood as to be inspired by both hermeneutics of suspicion and hermeneutics of faith
(Ricoeur, 1991; Sullivan, 2012). Although narratives can be understood as revealing the inner
world of the participants, it is also possible to understand narratives as reflecting certain
agendas that the participants appeared to have. The aim of my writing up stories was therefore
twofold. It was an attempt to capture the possibly intended agenda of each participant, but it
was also an attempt to explore and elucidate how experiences are contextual, personal and
related to time and space. I do not claim that the narratives created in this sub-study represent
“the truth.” However, they do represent an attempt to capture contextual truths that can be
understood as true at a certain time and in a certain relational context (Klevan, Davidson, Ruud,
& Karlsson, 2016).
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Troubling the Narrative Turn
As described above, I understand narrative analysis to work on both hermeneutics of
faith and hermeneutics of suspicion. The suspicion element is connected to an idea that what
people say is not only a reflection of their true and untainted meanings. People also have certain
agendas, explicit or more covert in what they say. The notion that people have such agendas
became very apparent to me in the interviews of Sub-study 3 which consisted of focus group
interviews with clinicians from crisis resolution teams.
Through these interviews, I understood the groups of clinicians to be discussing and
constructing their stories of how they understood helpful help and helpful practices within their
respective teams. Often, there appeared to be a great deal of agreement within the team. The
participants almost seemed to be speaking with “one voice.” In that sense, I experienced that
in these focus group interviews, each team appeared to create a joint story of their respective
team and its practices. They created the story of their team. However, although the dominant
stories of the teams appeared to be about how the participants experienced the CRTs to
represent new and more humanizing practices in the field of mental health, something about
the stories troubled me.
I reflected on the question: "What are the functions of the stories we tell ourselves and
others about ourselves and our practices?" According to Hitzler (2011), stories can be
understood as part of constructing our identities and justifying our actions, at individual and
group levels. Being a former mental health clinician myself, the uncomfortable thought of how
I had often had the need to present and understand myself and my practices in more favorable
ways than what was perhaps the reality struck me. I started thinking about how the positive
stories we create about ourselves and our practices, and the words we express them through
can conceal other stories. Happening over time and being enmeshed in the common workplace
culture – at what point do we stop noticing? To what extent are we allowed to notice? To
borrow from Goffman, in the context of impression-managed mental health organizational
stories, how free individual workers are to shape their own truth and stories emerged as an
important question for me. It was time to attempt to “move behind” possibly sanitized
“frontstage” stories. To me, as a former CRT clinician, this also involved revisiting my own
stories and experiences of working in a CRT. In doing so, I recognized how developing new
knowledge was entangled with my already-existing knowledge. Revisiting the old in the light
of the new was also an element in my process of becoming a researcher. It changed how I
understood the old and, hence, how I develop the new.
I still recall how proud I was back then, to be a part of the local CRT. The team
represented something like a new dawn in the field of mental health.
Humanizing, non-medicalizing, holistic, service user oriented, family and
network focused. Those words, we used them all.
“Crisis resolution team, how may I help you?” I was on call at the local crisis
resolution team (CRT). The person calling expressed deep distress and the need
for an appointment. I aimed to explore the nature of his distress. How severe
was it? Was this a “clear case” for the CRT or was it “just” a life crisis? We had
just been going through the current caseload of the team. The conclusion was
that our team worked with too many “light” cases and that we needed to “sift”
our service users more carefully. I asked the caller if he had any thoughts or
plans of ending his own life. “No, I don’t have thoughts like that.” “Ok…Well,
I’m sorry, but I don’t think the CRT is the appropriate service for you. We are
a service for those experiencing severe crises. May I suggest you contact your
GP instead?” The caller hesitates for a moment, and then snaps back. “Do you
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think I would have called if it wasn’t necessary?” He hangs up. Good. I had
managed to set some limits. I had acted professionally.
Why do I think this story from way back then is important? Why do I, all of a
sudden, seemingly move from a researcher position to a clinician position? To
me, there is always something of the past in the present. Even when my
reasoning and actions in the past, viewed from a present perspective, is not very
appealing. The clinician-me and the researcher-me seem to be entangled with
each other and my developing understandings of knowledge, truth and research.
What a mess.
Act 3 – The Discursive Turn
Both during interviews and in studying transcripts in sub study 3, I realized that a
frequent lack of coherence between what participants said and how they expressed was a
critical factor for my study because language can be understood as crucial in construction of
meaning and development of clinical practices but also in concealing a lack of change. I
selected a discursive psychological approach to explore how language is used in specific
contexts to constitute and construct certain meanings and actions (Klevan, Karlsson, Ness,
Grant & Ruud, 2016).
This approach acknowledges that people and their actions are shaped by not only
external structures and power relations but also through the ways people talk about and
understand their world (Winther Jørgensen, & Phillips, 1999).
Most kinds of discourse analysis tend to be suspicious of the purposes served by
people’s talk. Talk is never just talk, but has certain functions, both at local and macro levels.
Thus in the focus groups, I understood talk as possibly reflecting personal agendas and
positioning within the group, but also as reflecting issues of power and knowledge at conscious
and unconscious levels (Sullivan, 2012).
In the discursive psychological turn in sub-study 3, I aimed to introduce a more
suspicious and questioning approach to the understanding of data and my role as a researcher.
Thus in analyzing the data, I did not attempt to be un-biased. Neither did I follow a strict
sequentiality in the analysis. The identification of possible discourses involved a repeatedly
reading and interrogation the text to become familiar with the data. I coded rather long sections
in the material, aiming to focus simultaneously on what and how in terms of content of possible
discourses and how these were expressed in the groups. The material was organized into
clusters according to the content and how the participants expressed it. I then organized the
clusters into possible discourses, which I interrogated in relation to each interview and the data
set as whole. This whole process must be understood as a back and forth process. To me this
was a challenging way of working with data. Trying to reveal what was possibly expressed but
not clearly spoken and what mechanisms that influence what can and cannot be said, involved
an increased level of suspicion. While taking a suspicious stance felt important, not taking what
people say as face value was also somehow challenging. In my understanding, the knowledge
generated through the analysis was a result of my interaction with the participants during
interviews and my interaction with transcription texts after them. It was also a result of my
engagement with my own evolving suspicion that the truths we present or represent are part of
larger discourses about what counts as knowledge or not within the field of mental health. It
was a process of troubling and questioning not only the data but also myself and my positioning
and how this contributed in the development of knowledge.
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Troubling Through Dialogue and Curiosity
The above three acts are used to illustrate how knowledge and understanding are
intrinsically entwined with the researcher. This movement between each act can perhaps show
how knowledge, understanding and the qualitative researcher are dynamic and movable
processes. The researcher in motion meets and is inscribed within truths and knowledge in
motion. Motion requires some kind of propelling force. Moreover, this force also needs
nourishment to keep going. I like to think of the force as curiosity. If this is so, then perhaps
the fuel is dialogue, both with oneself and with others.
According to Frank (2010), dialogical approaches in research are connected to
recognizing the unfinalizability of the research participants and the stories they share. Stories
and people are in the making. However, in research, the person recognizing these
unfinalizabilities can also be understood as unfinalized. Thus, research can be understood as
encounters between becoming-persons and becoming-truths. In this sense, the task of the
researcher is not to report on truths existing outside the persons. Rather, the aim is to access
onto-epistemological becoming-truths, in the moment of the encounter (Davies, 2016; Mazzei,
2014).
To me the idea of accessing becoming-truths is a radical one and not necessarily one
that is encouraged in the research communities many PhD students are part of. It is somehow
paradoxical that qualitative research often appears to stay within its comfort zone, exploring
the unknown in known ways, and therefore simply endorsing and replicating the known.
According to Denzin and Giardinia (2008, p. 6),
They (students) are more often than not taught particular “methods of data
collection” within the context of research methods or research design courses;
it is few and far between that philosophy of science and philosophy of inquiry
seminars are required of graduate students—and even fewer still, we would
contend, that call into question or contest the very notion of data or evidence
itself.
Baumgarten (2001) explores the concept of curiosity as a virtue. According to Baumgarten,
curiosity is related to the desire to know. Curiosity differs from attentiveness and taking
interest, by its clear connection to this desire. The curious person will experience an apparent
lack, before the desire for a particular knowledge is satisfied. As such, curiosity can be
understood as a force that propels the troubling of existing knowledge and enables an expansion
of knowledge. In its implicit desire to question and expand, curiosity adheres to an
understanding of the world and knowledge as becoming. Through a desire to learn and to know,
humans engage with other human beings and the world. New knowledge can be created,
entailing that neither the actors, nor understandings of the world remain the same.
The desire to question and destabilize taken for granted assumptions may need a
sympathetic social environment in order to flourish. If our attempts to satisfy our curiosity and
trouble the world are met with restraining responses that direct us towards a stable and fixed
point of knowledge “as is,” a staggering number of curiosity-driven attempts to leave safe
ground will crash and burn. Perhaps a crucial feature of pedagogy and mentoring is to
encourage processes of curiosity and troubling. Sometimes, rather than being taught how
“proper” research should be done and being cultivated into becoming a respectable member of
the research society, as a becoming-researcher you need to be encouraged to let go of your
safety net (Colebrook, 2017).
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As a PhD student, I received several pieces of advice and well-meaning persuasion to
join the normative research community. One professor advised me to let go of my attempts to
explore and challenge conventional ways of doing data analysis. Another was deeply concerned
about how I made myself visible, suggesting that research should be about the informants and
not the researcher. Luckily, I was also encouraged to keep troubling.
Epilogue
This paper could be read as the story of the becoming of a researcher. Initially, when
starting out as a PhD student, I had no idea that the PhD journey would give me some answers,
furthermore, that it would give me confidence as a researcher. Did it? I guess the answer is
both yes and no. I have fewer answers, but I feel more confident in not having the answers.
The practice of being an unknowing researcher is something I can stand for.
Through the onto-epistemological turns explored above, truth and knowledge are better
understood as connected to ways of actively becoming in the world rather than being situated
in it (Davies, 2016; Grant, 2010; Mattingly, 2010). These ways of becoming in the world can
be understood as connected to emerging truths, to how truths are explored, and to myself as a
researcher. Moreover, my exploration of how the onto-epistemological assumptions and
methodology and my becoming as a researcher are connected can be understood as driven
forward by troubling as the source of propulsion. Troubling can be argued to be a force that
drives practices that aim for new understandings through change and movement but also
through uniting and contextualizing. Troubling needs to be understood as entwined with the
researcher and the relational contexts the researcher is involved in, at both micro- and macrolevels. Troubling requires the acknowledgement of a culturally embedded and experiencing
researcher.
To me research and its possibilities of expanding and troubling knowledge, truths and
the world are of crucial importance. It is not just about finding truth. It is also about challenging
how we find and what we hold as truth. It is about shaking us out of our deep, safe and
comfortable slumber. It is about triggering and reinstating curiosity and attentiveness. Minnich
(2016) describes attentiveness on a continuum. At the one end, there is the insensitive, closed
denial to recognize as significant anything except what one has already habitually categorized.
At the opposite end, we sense and take in something or someone with full consciousness
untainted by such preconceptions. This involves being open to new encounters and to the
uniqueness even of the familiar. Listening with full attentiveness opens up free thinking. It
entails the possibility for movement and the jettisoning of predefined categories (Davies, 2016;
Minnich, 2016).
Through its potential to question, trouble, destabilize and expand, curiosity can be
understood as connected to onto-epistemological understandings of the world and people as
made and in the becoming. In this sense it is possible to connect curiosity to diffraction. Barad
(2007) uses diffraction as a new materialist conceptual replacement for reflexivity. Reflexivity
pre-supposes known, predictable people, changing in predictable ways within pre-established
reality-knowledge parameters. In contrast to reflexivity, diffraction does not reproduce an
image of what we assume is already there. Diffraction focuses on the ongoing production of
ourselves, the other, and reality through intra-action. Thus, it concerns subjects and truths in
the making (Barad 2007; Klevan, 2017).
Ironically, the word “production” often appears to pop up in academia. In our
universities, we tend to talk about production of academic papers, or the production of students
or PhDs. Less attention is given to how we produce doctoral students and what purpose such
production serves. Following Barad (2007), should a person with a PhD be simply another
product in terms of them simply constituting the reproduction of a standard image of existing,
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safe research practices and practitioners? Or should the “production” of doctoral students focus
on nurturing their ongoing and unfinalized self- other- and world-realities?
Furthermore, should research reflect “reality” or should it also address and trouble what
and whose purposes reality serves? Alvesson and Spicer (2012, 2016) suggest that often
organizations are characterized by restricted cognition and a refusal to encourage and value
intellectual capacities, reflexivity and demands for justification of the status quo. The authors
refer to this as “functional stupidity” (Alvesson & Spicer, 2012, p. 1196) that serves the purpose
of creating unquestioning employees who adhere to a single, master narrative of the
organization and its purposes, suppressing more critical and negative voices.
What do the expectations placed on and accepted more or less by academics to adhere
to predefined and single storylines actually do to them? What is at risk? Curiosity may have
killed the cat, but it may also provide lifesaving support to researchers. Understanding the
researcher, the world and knowledge as becoming, also implies that curiosity is not something
that “is” but rather something that develops and becomes through intra-actions. My concern
about keeping curiosity vital is thus not only about supporting and encouraging it as a trait that
researchers should possess. It is also about developing research communities and
understandings of what counts as knowledge that are simultaneously curiosity-based, curiositynurturing and curiosity-troubling. However, how can we maintain our curiosity in academia?
How do we develop and keep our sense of curiosity vital and troubling? Water has no clearly
defined color.
***
Bengt: I find Trude’s writing very interesting and stimulating, related to her troubling
of research, the researcher, scientific knowledge and what truth can be. To me Trude raises two
important questions in her epilogue. The first is how we can maintain our curiosity in academia
and the other is how we can keep our sense of curiosity vital and troubling? I would like to
elaborate on Trude’s arguments while continuing to trouble the notions of research, scientific
knowledge production and truth within the mental health field.
The history of the field of mental health cries out for such troubling. Foucault (1967)
describes how the understanding of mental health problems is closely linked to the taken for
granted medical understanding of people being divided into being either insane or normal.
Furthermore, he states that our understanding of being insane or normal varies as a function of
shifting cultural, historical and social periods. Bringing mad people into institutions was based
in a humanistic understanding of treatment and care. Foucault describes how these humanistic
ideas and practices very often, and soon however, turned into dehumanized oppression and
stigmatization. He elaborates on how the question of humanistic and dehumanistic practices
will always be at stake in the understanding of mental health issues. To Foucault, this points to
the dialectical relationship between knowledge/power and truth. Knowledge gives power, and
power gives knowledge and the right to tell what the truth is.
In this context, I would like to quote Baak (2016, p. 29): “Research is a dirty word for
many of those who have been affected by colonialism and its legacies.” Baak uses the word
“dirty” because research as a term and set of practices is linked to Western imperialism and
colonialism. To me the research on mental health issues is an example of this. It is based in an
assumption and an understanding grounded in the western medical model, which focuses on
mental health problems as individual sickness and disorders, caused by the individuals
themselves who need individual cure.
Mainstream research within mental health is dominated by the biomedical approach,
which includes the basic assumptions and vocabulary of “mental disorders.” This vocabulary
states that people experience changes to their lives as a result of severe mental illness. Recently,
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the United Nation Human Rights Council in Geneva published a report which stated that the
western medical model is outdated and there is therefore an urgent need to prioritize policy
innovation at population levels internationally. The report underlines the need to target social
aspects and factors of mental health issues, focusing on inclusive and accepting communities
for every citizen (UN Human Rights Council, 2017).
Lundstøl (1999) refers to the Greek philosopher Aristotle and his three areas of
knowledge: 1. Theoretical, 2. Practical and 3. Experience-based. Lundstøl emphasizes that
these are equal forms of knowledge. One form of knowledge is not superior or any truer than
the others. This is important in understanding what makes knowledge “valid.” In the current
mental health cultural context, the theoretical knowledge domain—especially in the form of
research-based or scientific knowledge—prevails and sometimes monopolizes what constitutes
valid knowledge.
Today, scientific knowledge is referred to as evidence-based knowledge. Ekeland
(2004, 2011) refers to this as the “Gospel of evidence,” preaching that scientific knowledge is
the true knowledge. Researchers and politicians often use statements like “Research shows that
...” or “This knowledge is evidence-based ...” Both statements indicate that knowledge based
on research or evidence-based methodology represents the truth—even more true and more
valid than other forms of knowledge, such as that which is practical or experience-based. The
rhetoric rests on the fact that knowledge-based is synonymous with evidence-based knowledge,
developed through randomized, controlled studies and meta-analyzes. This in turn is referred
to as the “gold standard” of scientific knowledge production—knowledge which is considered
as most obviously the highest ranked in the hierarchy of methodologies.
I criticize mental health science and evidence-based practice for such an excessive
focus on methodology and less on critical reflection (Karlsson, 2016). Such evidence-based
understandings trivialize and subordinate experience-based knowledge in mental health
research. Thus, the Gospel of evidence becomes a hegemonic power discourse about
knowledge. This discourse affects us both as collective and individual researchers. How this
discourse affects me on a personal level as a researcher is something I have been thinking about
in recent years. I am a qualitative researcher and as such I emphasize the importance of listing
to people’s stories in research. However, at a certain point, I experienced a disturbing feeling
about turning these stories into research, academic writing and scientific papers. The implicit
idea and expectation of doing so is that academic writing will make people’s stories more
trustworthy and true. I read in a newspaper recently that there are 17,000 academic papers
published in the world each day. I wonder how many stories there are to be told, researched
and read.
Alec: I agree with Bengt when he says that Trude’s writing makes an excellent
troubling contribution. I’m interested in picking up on her point that knowledge is always
context-dependent. Knowledge always comes from somewhere and is always political, even
when it pretends otherwise. As Bengt also suggests, mental/health research can more or less
unwittingly constitute, and contribute to, oppressive practice. In its non-critical variety, I think
one of its functions is to keep people—including doctoral researchers and their participants—
in their place in the societal and academic moral order.
That this is not sufficiently robustly challenged is strange and disappointing. From an
onto-epistemological standpoint rejecting of foundational, essential and transcendent certainty,
there are no privileged metanarratives. It’s just not possible to step outside of time and place to
argue with absolute certainty about anything. “Truth” is an unfortunate word, and Latour
(2013) makes the point that many social and natural scientists wrongly confuse knowledge with
truth. There are lots of knowledge(s); lots of windows on the world, and behind them are lots
of people looking through glass, more or less darkly.

1254

The Qualitative Report 2019

What Trude has seen in her research journey pulled on her to both see it, and to see
herself seeing. Her vistas constantly shifted and changed, as did she, and as did what she
needed, wanted, chose, and was forced to see. There are differences between all of these optical
positions: often what she needed to see was the result of her vision being constrained by
normative academic processes. What she wanted and chose to see was in large part conditioned
by these processes, at least to start with, until she became more independent of normative
academe. What she was forced to then begin to see seems to me to be a function of this
increasing independence and curiosity. While, through necessity, keeping a place in the
emotionally-chilled conventional academic world, Trude unashamedly joined the community
of warm, passionate, transgressive international scholarship—the Paraversity.
And of course, the “I” that is Trude is constantly, inescapably entangled in passionate
knowledge, at personal, professional and academic levels. Normative researchers are far too
icebergish, in keeping much of what makes for their research coolly submerged below the line
of outside scrutiny. Six decades ago, Wright Mills (1959) urged social researchers to do the
opposite by making their private matters public concerns. It’s unfortunate that his call has been
insufficiently heeded. I think this is because of a long-standing, inappropriate disparagement
of subjectivism—something that in my experience is—ironically—particularly true in
mental/health qualitative inquiry (Grant, 2018; Grant, Short, & Turner, 2013).
As Trude argues, challenging the assumptions underpinning knowledge is an emergent,
diffractive task. Drawing on DeleuzoGuatarrian ideas (Fox & Alldred, 2013), I believe that her
research journey was a courageous line of flight away from normative qualitative inquiry
practices and assumptions. Slavish adherence to these can lead to bland, anodyne research, and
knowledge that doesn’t really rock any cultural boats (Grant, 2018). I’m with Chomsky and
many other critical educationalists, when they argue that knowledge should trouble the world.
Well done, Trude!
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